Abstract. The paper deals with the problem of agents conformance with multiparty protocols. We introduce a notion of conformance of a set of k agents with a multiparty protocol with k roles, which requires the agents to be interoperable and to produce correct executions of the protocol. We introduce conditions that enable each agent to be independently verified with respect to the protocol. We assume that protocols are specified in a temporal action theory and we show that the problem of verifying the conformance of an agent with a protocol can be solved by making use of automata based techniques. Protocols with nonterminating computations, modeling reactive agents, can also be captured in this framework.
Introduction
In an open environment, the interaction of agents is ruled by interaction protocols on which agents commonly agree. An important issue, in this regard, concerns agent conformance with the protocol. Although agent policy may somehow deviate from the behavior dictated by the protocol, in some cases we want, nevertheless, to regard the policy as being compatible with the protocol. A related issue concerns the interoperability of agents in an open environment. The need for conditions to guarantee that a set of agents may interact properly, has led to the introduction of different notions of compatibility among agents [4] as well as to the definition of notions of conformance of an agent with a protocol [2, 5, 11, 17] .
In this paper, we define a notion of agent conformance for the general case of multiparty protocols. This notion must assure that a set of agents, that are conformant with a protocol, interoperate (in particular, they do not get stuck) and that their interactions produce correct executions of the protocol.
In our proposal, the specification of agents and protocols is given in a temporal action theory [9, 13] , by means of temporal constraints, and the communication among agents is synchronous. Protocols are given a declarative specification consisting of: (i) the specification of communicative actions by means of their effects and preconditions on the social state which, in particular, includes commitments; (ii) a set of temporal constraints, which specify the wanted interactions (and, under this respect, our approach to protocol specification is similar to the one proposed in DecSerFlow [21] ). Protocols with nonterminating computations, modeling reactive services [8] , can also be captured in this framework.
We define a multiparty protocol P with k roles, by separately specifying the behavior of all roles P 1 , . . . , P k in the protocol. We then introduce a notion of interoperability among a set of agents, which guarantees the agents to interact properly. More precisely, each agent can freely choose among its possible emissions without the computation getting stuck.
Given a multiparty protocol P , we define a notion of conformance of a set of agents A 1 , . . . , A k with P : agents A 1 , . . . , A k interoperate and their interaction only produces runs of the protocol P . Verifying the conformance of a set of agents all together, however, is not feasible in an open environment, as, in general, the internal behavior of all agents participating in a protocol is not known. The verification of each agent participating in the protocol must be done independently.
In this paper, we introduce a definition of conformance of a single agent A i (playing role i) with the protocol P . We will see that verifying an agent A i with respect with its role P i is not sufficient to guarantee the interoperability of a set of conformant agents in the multiparty case, unless a rather narrow notion of conformance is adopted. Indeed, our notion of conformance of an agent A i with a protocol P is defined by comparing the runs of agent A i , when executed in the context of the protocol, and the runs of P itself. We prove that a set of agents which are independently conformant with the protocol P are guaranteed to be interoperable and to produce correct executions of P .
Starting from a specification of the protocol in a temporal logic, the problem of verifying the conformance of an agent with a protocol can be solved by making use of an automata based approach. In particular, interoperability can be checked by working on the Büchi automaton which can be extracted from the logical specification of the protocol.
Protocol Specification
The specification of interaction protocols we adopt is based on Dynamic Linear Time Temporal Logic (DLTL) [15] , a linear time temporal logic which extends LTL by allowing the until operator to be indexed by programs in Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL). DLTL allows until formulas of the form αU π β, where the program π ∈ P rg(Σ) is a regular expression built from a set Σ of atomic actions. More precisely, P rg(Σ) ::= a | π 1 + π 2 | π 1 ; π 2 | π * , where a ∈ Σ and π 1 , π 2 , π range over P rg (Σ) .
As for LTL, DLTL models are infinite linear sequences of worlds (propositional interpretations), each one reachable from the initial world by a finite sequence τ of actions in the alphabet Σ. More precisely, a model M = (σ, V ) consists of an infinite sequence of actions σ over Σ (the sequence of actions executed from the initial world) and a valuation function V , defining the interpretation of propositions at each world τ (where τ is a prefix of σ).
In the following, we denote by prf (σ) the set of all finite prefixes of σ (the worlds) and, for each regular program π, we denote by [[π] ] the set of finite sequences associated with π. Given a model M = (σ, V ), a finite word τ ∈ prf (σ) and a formula α, the satisfiability of a formula α at τ in M , written M, τ |= α, is defined as usual for the classical connectives. Moreover:
] such that ττ ∈ prf (σ) and M, ττ |= β. Moreover, for every τ such that ε ≤ τ < τ , M, ττ |= α.
A formula αU π β is true at a world τ if "α until β" is true on a finite stretch of behavior which is in the linear time behavior of the program π.
The derived modalities π and [π] can be defined as follows:
* (representing all finite actions sequences), we replace π with 3 and [π] with 2. Furthermore, the (next) operator can be defined as α ≡ a∈Σ a α. As shown in [15] , DLTL(Σ) is strictly more expressive than LTL(Σ). The satisfiability and validity problems for DLTL are PSPACE complete problems [15] .
In this paper, we make use of the Product version of DLTL, DLT L ⊗ [14] , which allows to describe the behavior of a network of sequential agents which coordinate their activities by performing common actions together. There are k agents 1, . . . , k, and a distributed alphabetΣ
, a family of (possibly non-disjoint) alphabets, with each Σ i a non-empty, finite set of actions (Σ i is the set of actions which require the participation of agent i).
Atomic propositions are introduced in a local fashion, by introducing a nonempty set of atomic propositions P. For each atomic proposition p ∈ P and agent i, p i represents the "local" view of the proposition p at i, and is evaluated in the local state of agent i. The formulas of the language are obtained as the boolean combination of the formulas of DLT L ⊗ i which can be constructed on the alphabet (actions and propositions) of each agent i, using the modalities
is a family of valuation functions, one for each agent i. The satisfiability of the formulas of DLT L ⊗ i is evaluated by making use of V i and of the projection σ| i of σ to Σ i (where σ| i is the sequence obtained by erasing from σ all occurrences of symbols that are not in Σ i ).
We illustrate how a protocol can be specified in this framework trough the specification of a Purchase protocol. Example 1. We have three roles: the merchant (mr), the customer (ct) and the bank (bk). ct sends a request to mr ; mr replies with an offer or by saying that the requested good is not available. If ct receives the offer, it may either accept the offer and send a payment request to bk, or refuse the offer. If ct accepts the offer, then mr delivers the goods. If ct requires bk to pay mr, bk sends the payment. ct can send the request for payment to bk even before it has received the goods.
In this example, all actions are communicative actions:sendRequest, sendOffer, sendNotAvail, sendAccept, sendRefuse, sendPaymentReqest, sendPayment, each one belonging to the action alphabet of the sender and of the receiver. For instance, action sendRequest is both in Σ ct (as ct is the sender of the request) and in Σ mr (as mr is the receiver of the request). Communication is synchronous: roles communicate by synchronizing on the execution of communicative actions.
The Purchase protocol P u is given by specifying separately the protocols of the three participating roles: P ct , P mr and P bk . The role P i in the protoocol is specified by a domain description D i , which is a pair (Π i , C i ), where Π i is a set of formulas describing the effects and preconditions of the actions (the action theory) of role i, and C i is a set of constraints that the executions of role i must satisfy. The approach is a generalization of the one proposed in [13] .
Let us define, for instance, the domain description D mr = (Π mr , C mr ) of the merchant. We adopt a social approach where an interaction protocol is specified by describing the effects of communicative actions on the social state. The social state contains the domain specific fluents describing observable facts concerning the execution of the protocol (request, the customer has requested a quote, accepted, the customer has accepted the quote, etc.), but also special fluents to model commitments (and conditional commitments) among the roles [22, 20] : say that: when mr sends the quote for the good, then it commits to send the goods if ct accepts the request; and when mr sends the quote for the good, if there is a request, the request is cancelled.
Causal laws CL mr are intended to expresses "causal" dependencies (or ramifications) among fluents. In this framework they are used to rule the dynamics of commitments. For instance, the causal law:
says that a commitment to bring about α is cancelled when α holds. Other causal laws are needed for dealing with conditional commitments.
Precondition laws PL have the form: 2(α → [a]⊥), meaning that the execution of an action a is not possible if α holds. The precondition law
says that an offer cannot be sent if a request has not been issued.
The initial state IS of the protocol defines the initial value of all the fluents. Here, we assume that the initial state is complete.
Action laws and causal laws describe the changes to the state. All other fluents which are not changed by action execution are assumed to persist unaltered to the next state. To cope with the frame problem [18] we use a completion construction Comp, which is applied given a domain description, introduces frame axioms in the style of the successor state axioms proposed by Reiter [19] . The completion construction Comp is only applied to the action laws and to the causal laws [13] . Thus Π mr is defined as Comp(AL ∧ CL) ∧ PL ∧ IS.
The second component C mr of the domain description P mr defines constraints as arbitrary temporal formulas of DLTL mr . For instance, to model the fact that the merchant cannot send more than one offer, we introduce the constraint: ¬3 mr sendOffer mr 3 mr sendOffer mr .
We are interested in those execution of the purchase protocol in which all commitments of all the roles have been fulfilled. In particular, for each commitment C(i, j, α) of which the merchant is a debtor or a creditor (i.e., i = mr or j = mr), we add in C mr the constraint:
meaning that a commitment has to be fulfilled unless it is cancelled.
Given D mr = (Π mr , C mr ) as defined above, we let P mr = Π mr ∧ C mr . Once the protocols P ct , P mr and P bk have been defined, the specification P u of the Purchase protocol can be given as: P u = P ct ∧P mr ∧P bk . The runs of the protocol are then defined to be the linear models of P u. They are all the runs that can be obtained by interleaving the actions of the runs of P ct , P mr and P bk , while synchronizing on common actions. By projecting the runs of the protocol P u to the alphabets of the participating roles, we get runs of each role P ct , P mr and P bk . As the properties we will consider in this paper regard only the sequence of communicative action exchanged between agents, in the following, we will consider protocol runs as infinite sequences of actions, and disregard worlds.
Note that protocol runs are always infinite, as logic DLTL is characterized by infinite models and we assume that all agents have infinite runs. Therefore, infinite protocols can be easily modelled in our framework. For instance, to model the infinite protocol in which the customer repeatedly issues a request, we can add to the specification above the constraint: 2 ct 3 ct sendRequest ct , requiring that the message request is issued infinitely many times. When we want to model terminating protocols, as the Purchase protocol above, we assume the domain description of each role of the protocol to be suitably extended with an action noop i which does nothing and which can be executed forever after termination of the protocol. Hence, in the following, we will assume that, for all i, the i-th projection of a run σ of a protocol P is an infinite run σ| i of P i .
A protocol specification similar to the one above has been used in [12] to deal with problem of service composition. As a difference, here we use the product version of DLTL so to specify the role of each role P i independently, while in [12] a global specification of the protocol was given, including all roles.
A protocol defined as above, is not guaranteed to be well behaved, and we must impose some constraints on its structure to guarantee that the different roles participating in the protocol interoperate. To define the interoperability of a set of roles, we will put conditions on the computations of the interacting roles, which can be described by making use of Büchi automata.
Automata Based Verification
As usual for LTL, a DLTL formula can be mapped into a Büchi automaton so that the accepting runs of the automaton correspond to the models of the formula.
We recall that a Büchi automaton has the same structure as a traditional finite state automaton, with the difference that it accepts infinite words. More precisely a Büchi automaton over an alphabet Σ is a tuple B = (Q, →, Q in , F ) where:
• Q is a finite nonempty set of states;
• F ⊆ Q is a set of accepting states.
Let σ ∈ Σ ω be an infinite word on Σ. Then a run of B over σ is a mapping
Informally, a run is accepting if it goes infinitely many times trough a final state.
As described in [15] , the satisfiability problem for DLTL can be solved in deterministic exponential time, as for LTL. Given a domain description (Π, C), a corresponding Büchi automaton can be obtained such that all runs accepted by the automaton represent runs of the protocol, and vice versa. An algorithm for constructing on-the-fly a Büchi automaton from a DLTL formula has been proposed in [10] , by generalizing the tableau-based algorithm for LTL. In general, this Büchi automaton is non-deterministic.
Let P = P 1 ∧ . . . ∧ P k be a protocol such that each role P i is specified by a nondeterministic Büchi automaton
, whose accepting runs provide all the correct executions of the role. We assume that these automata have been "pruned" by eliminating all the states which do not occur on any accepting run. This can be achieved by starting from the accepting states, and by propagating backwards the information on the states for which a path to an accepting state exists.
The interactions of P 1 , . . . , P k can be described by the runs of a product automaton M overΣ. The states of M will be k-tuples 
where q[i] denotes the ith component of q = q 1 , . . . , q k , and Ag(a) is the set of agents sharing action a. Moreover,
The run is accepting if, for all i = 1, . . . , k, σ| i is infinite and ρ(τ )[i] ∈ F i for infinitely many τ ∈ prf (σ). The runs of M describe the interleaving of the executions of P 1 , . . . , P k , synchronizing on common actions.
Observe that, in an accepting run of M, each M i is executing a loop containing at least an accepting state in F i . We will call such a loop in M i an accepting loop for P i . Vice-versa, a loop in M i which does not contain any state in F i will be called a non accepting loop for P i . In the following section we introduce a notion of interoperability of a set of roles P 1 , . . . , P k by putting conditions on (accepting and non accepting) runs of M and of the M i 's.
Interoperability
Let us consider an alternative specification P ct of the customer role, according to which, after sending a request, the customer has to wait for an offer and it does not expect to receive from the merchant the answer "goods is not available". In such a case, the customer role P ct would not interact properly with the merchant role P mr as defined in the previous section. If the merchant, after receiving a request from the customer, chooses to reply with sendNotAvail, the computation gets stuck, as the customer role P ct cannot receive this message.
This example shows that, as the different roles of the protocol are defined separately, some requirement is needed to guarantee that such roles interact properly, so that the protocol as a whole is well defined. In particular, the interaction of the roles in the protocol should not produce deadlock. Similarly, we want to avoid infinite executions in which some role P i of the protocol is not executing an accepting run as, either, from some point onwards, P i does not execute any action, or P i is executing infinitely many actions, but on a non accepting run for P i .
In the following, given the roles P 1 , . . . , P k of a protocol, as introduced in Section 2, we say that roles P 1 , . . . , P k are interoperable when they are free of choosing their actions at each step avoiding deadlock and non accepting executions. Let us point out that here we are considering in two different ways the nondeterministic choices concerning emissions (the customer can accept or refuse an offer) and those concerning receptions (the customer can receive the messages sendOffer or sendNotAvail). As usual in agent and web service applications, we assume that, in the first case, the choice is internal to the role (internal non determinism), while, in the second case, the choice is external to the agent and depends on the environment, namely on the interleaving of actions of partner agents (external non determinism). Hence, we postulate that a role can choose which message to send among the messages it can send in a state (the customer can decide whether to accept or refuse an offer), but that it cannot chose which message to receive among the messages he can receive in a state (the customer waits for sendOffer or sendNotAvail, but it cannot choose which one it will receive).
We can now define a notion of interoperability. We will denote by m(i, j) the communicative action m sent from i to j.
be the prefix of a run of M i . To model the fact that each P i must be able to choose which action to execute after π i , we introduce a function choice(P i , π i ), whose value is defined as follows: either choice(P i , π i ) = m(i, j), where m(i, j) is a send action that can be executed after π i on an accepting run of M i (i.e., there is an accepting run of P i with prefix q 0
or the value choice(P i , π i ) = receiveR, where R = {m 1 (j 1 , i) , . . . , m n (j n , i)} contains all the receive actions that can be executed after π i on an accepting run of M i . In the last case, P i expects to receive a message from another agent after π i but it doesn't know which one it will receive among those messages {m 1 (j 1 , i) , . . . , m n (j n , i)} it is able to receive after π i . Observe that the choice of agent P i in π i may depend on the state q v but also on the sequence of actions a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a v executed by P i up to q v .
While we have assumed that agents can choose among the messages they can send, we have postulated that they cannot decide which message they will receive among those they are able to receive in a given state.
As a matter of notation, in the following, we say that σ is an execution of P when there is a (not necessarily accepting) run q 0
We say that π is a finite execution of P when π is a finite prefix of an execution of P . We say that σ is an accepting run of P when there is an accepting run of M over σ.
We say that σ is an execution of P 1 . . . P k respecting the function "choice" if σ is an execution of P 1 . . . P k such that, for each prefix πm(i, j) of σ, it holds that choice(P i , π| i ) = m(i, j) and choice(P j , π| j ) = receiveR, with m(i, j) ∈ R.
We say that a choice function is fair for P i if there is no execution of P i respecting the choice function, in which P i executes infinitely many times a nonaccepting loop of M i , although there is a send action m(i, j) that P i can execute in some state of the loop leading outside the loop. A choice function is fair if it is fair for all the P i 's. We say that σ is a fair execution of P 1 . . . P k if σ is an execution of P 1 . . . P k respecting a fair choice function.
In essence, according to a fair choice function, role P i cannot choose to execute infinitely many times a non accepting loop, if it can exit the loop by executing a send action: P i cannot be willing to execute infinitely many times a non-accepting loop. The interoperability of a set of roles is defined as follows: According to the above definition, any prefix obtained by the execution of P 1 , . . . , P k can be extended by executing a new action according to the choice function. In particular, each agent can choose which action it wants to execute at each stage of the computation and, whatever the choice might be, the computation does not get stuck (condition(i)) and, eventually, each agent can execute his choice in an accepting run (condition (ii)).
Observe that the choice of a role P i after a sequence π of execution steps only depends on the actions of P i up to that point (namely, on π| i ). Hence, the choice of P i is left unchanged by the execution of communicative actions not involving P i . As a consequence, the choice of agent P i remains unchanged until eventually it is fulfilled by the execution of the chosen action.
The conditions above guarantee that the choice of an agent cannot be delayed forever by the choices of other agents. The following proposition follows easily from the definition of interoperability above: Proof. By condition (i), the finite execution π can be extended to an infinite execution σ respecting the fair choice function. By condition (ii) the fair execution σ respecting the fair choice function is an accepting run of P 1 . . . P k . As P i must execute infinitely many actions on σ, it will eventually execute an action after π according to his choice in π. Namely, P i will eventually execute m(i, j) (respectively, m(j, i)) as its first action after π. The proof of point (2) is similar.
Proposition 1. (a) For each fair choice functions, for each finite executions
Let us consider the example in Figure 1 . Role P 1 can repeatedly either send message m(1, 2) to P 2 or message m(1, 3) to P 3 . Role P 1 can go on choosing to send m(1, 2) to P 2 , so that P 3 is not executing any action. This choice is fair. P 2 and P 3 have the only (fair) choice of executing the receive m(1, 2) and the receive m(1, 2), respectively. P 1 , P 2 , P 3 are not interoperable. According to the above fair choices, P 1 and P 2 can go on exchanging message m(1, 2), and they produce an execution σ which is an accepting run of P 1 and of P 2 , but is not an accepting run of P 3 (P 3 does not execute any action on σ). σ is a fair execution of P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , but it is not a run of P 1 , P 2 , P 3 . Condition (ii) fails.
As a different example, let us consider the example in Figure 2 . The runs of P 2 are those sequences obtained by repeating infinitely many times: a (nonempty) finite sequence of actions m 1 (1, 2) followed by an action m 2 (1, 2). P 1 and P 2 can go on by exchanging the message m 1 (1, 2), thus producing a fair execution σ (in each state, P 2 has the fair choice of executing a receive, but it cannot control which message is received). While for P 1 σ an accepting run, for P 2 it is not. Although P 2 executes infinitely many actions in σ , it does not execute a run. P 1 and P 2 are not interoperable, as condition (ii) is not satisfied.
Conformance
Let A 1 , . . . , A k be a set of agents. The specification of each agent A i can be either given through a logical specification as the one introduced in Section 2 for roles, or by introducing the automaton describing the possible behaviors of the agent. We assume that the actions of each agent A i are deterministic and that the automaton describing its possible behaviors is a deterministic Büchi automaton. In this section we want to introduce a notion of conformance of a single agent A i with the protocol P , so that the conformance of each A i , proved independently, guarantees the conformance of the overall set of agents A 1 , . . . , A k with P , according to Definition 2. Given the definition of interoperability given in the previous section, this notion of conformance can be based on the policy: less emissions and more receptions [4, 2, 11] . Consider, for instance, a customer agent A ct whose behavior differs from that of the role "customer" of protocol P u as follows: whenever it receives an offer from the merchant, it always accepts it; after accepting the offer it expects to receive from P mr either sendGoods or cancelDelivery. Although the behavior of A ct and that of the corresponding role of the protocol are different, we could consider however the agent to be conformant with the protocol, since the customer can choose which messages to send, and thus it is not forced to send all the messages required by the protocol. Also, the agent can receive more messages than those required by the protocol, since these receptions will never be executed.
Let M i be the automaton specifying role P i and M A i the automaton specifying agent A i . We can formulate the policy "less emissions and more receptions" with the following condition. Let π be a finite execution common to A i and P i : Unfortunately, the policy "less emissions and more receptions" only works for two-party protocols, as shown in the next example.
Example 2. Consider protocol P u. The customer ct, at some point, may accept the offer of mr and require bk to send the payment to mr. Assume that mr has the requirement that it can receive the payment from bk only after it has received the acceptance of the offer from ct. Namely, the specification of P mr contains the constraint:
According to the protocols of ct and bk the message sendP ayment can be sent from bk to mr either before or after the message sendAccept is sent from ct to mr. It is clear that, although ct and bk do not put constraints on the order in which they send the acceptance of the offer and the payment to mr, in the overall protocol P u they are forced to respect the constraint of the merchant, and only the runs in which sendAccept is executed before sendP ayment are accepted as runs of P u.
Let us now consider an agent A mr , playing the role of the merchant, whose behavior is the following: either it receives a message sendAccept followed by a message sendP ayment, or receives a message sendP ayment followed by a message sendAccept. Agent A mr allows for more receptions with respect to its role P mr (in fact, A mr receives the additional message sendP ayment followed by a message sendAccept). When A mr interacts with a customer and a bank agents behaving as stipulated by P ct and P bk , it may produce an execution in which sendP ayment comes before sendAccept, which is not a run of protocol P u (as it does not satisfy the constraint (*) above). Conversely, if we consider a variant P u of the P u protocol in which the roles of the bank P bk and of the customer P ct coordinate their executions so that they execute sendAccept before sendP ayment, the interaction of agent A mr with the other roles cannot produce the unwanted execution in which sendP ayment comes before sendAccept.
In this example, A mr can be regarded to be non-conformant with protocol P u, but conformant with the protocol P u , although P mr is the same in both protocols. The case in which A mr is non-conformant with P u, is similar to the example discussed in [17] , where the problem of conformance checking is analyzed for models of asynchronous message passing software. The solution adopted in [17] is that of requiring that an agent A i cannot do more receptions than those established by protocol P i , so that: A i can do less emission and exactly the same receptions as stated by P i . In the example above, this would correspond to take A mr as being non-conformant. We believe that this policy is too restrictive: as we see from Example 2, the conformance of A mr depends on the overall protocol, including other roles. In the following, we propose a definition of the conformance of an agent A i with respect to the overall protocol P , rather than to its role P i . We are ready to admit additional receptions in A i , if we are sure that such receptions cannot give rise to unwanted executions when A i interacts with agents respecting protocol P .
In the following, besides referring to the executions and runs of a protocol P , we need to refer to the executions and runs of an agent A i in the context of the protocol P . We will denote by P [A i ] the set of roles/agents
represents the protocol obtained from P by replacing role P i with agent A i . Also, we will refer to the executions (accepting runs) of P 1 , . . . ,
To guarantee that an agent A i is conformant with a protocol P , we need to introduce, besides (C1) and (C2) above, further conditions which ensure that A i interacts properly with the other roles in the protocol P : 
Condition (C3) says that P [A i ] is interoperable, that is
A i interacts with with P 1 , . . . , P i−1 , P i+1 , . . . , P n so that each role can make its choices without the computation getting stuck or ending up in non accepting loops.
Condition (C4) requires that the executions of A i are correct when A i is interacting with other agents respecting the protocol P . In particular, this ensures that although A i can execute more receptions than P i , such additional receptions are not executed when A i interacts with the other roles in P .
Observe that condition (C4) can be equivalently expressed in the logic by saying that the formula P [A i ] → P has to be valid.
According to the above definition of conformance, the merchant agent A mr in Example 2 is conformant with P u , while A mr is non-conformant with protocol P u. In fact, although P u[A mr ] is interoperable (and, in particular, A mr can interact with other agents executing the protocol without getting stuck), there is a run of P u[A mr ], in which sendPayment comes before sendAccept, that is not a run of P u (and therefore (C4) is violated). This last case shows that the interoperability of A i with the other roles in P is not sufficient to guarantee the correctness of the resulting runs with respect to P .
Are conditions (C1) to (C4) sufficient to guarantee the conformance of an agent with a protocol? What we expect is that, given an interoperable protocol P and a set of agents A 1 , . . . , A k , if each agent A i is conformant with P (according to (C1)... (C4)) then the agents A 1 , . . . , A k interoperate and their accepting runs are runs of P .
Consider the roles P 1 and P 2 and the agents A 1 and A 2 in Figure 3 . P 1 and P 2 interoperate. A 1 has the same receptions and less emissions than P 1 (the send action m 3 (1, 2) is not present in A 1 ). A 1 is conformant with P (according to conditions (C1),..,(C4)). In particular, A 1 and P 2 interoperate: for any fair choice function, P 2 cannot produce the infinite execution σ = m 1 (1, 2), m 2 (2, 1), m 1 (1, 2), m 2 (2, 1) , . . ., as P 2 must eventually execute the send action m 4 (2, 1). Similarly, A 2 is conformant with P and it has the same receptions and less emissions than P 1 (it misses the send action m 4 (2, 1)). However, A 1 and A 2 do not interoperate: A 1 and A 2 have the only choice of executing σ and this is a fair choice for A 1 and A 2 . However, σ is not a run of A 1 , A 2 , and this violates interoperability condition (ii).
Observe that the choice of executing σ is fair for A 1 , as A 1 has not the choice of executing any action to exit the non accepting loop in σ. Instead, the execution σ is not fair for P 1 , as P 1 can choose to exit the non accepting loop by executing the send action m 3 (1, 2). We introduce the following condition:
(C5) For each σ execution of both A i and P i , if σ is a fair execution of A i , then σ is a fair execution of P i .
Condition (C5) is violated by A 1 (and by A 2 ) in Figure 3 . The choice of executing σ is fair for A 1 , as there is no send action that agent A 1 can execute to exit from the non accepting loop. Instead, the choice of executing σ is not fair for P 1 which can execute action m 3 (1, 2) to exit from the non accepting loop. The verification of condition (C5) requires reasoning on non accepting loops in the automata of A i and P i . The idea is that, although A i can contain less emissions than P i , it must contain al least those emissions allowing to go out from non accepting loop and to go on with an accepting run, if this is possible for P i .
Finally, we introduce the following conditions to deal with infinite computations, which requires that, when A i and P i produce a common action sequence, then either they both accept it or they both do not accept it.
(C6) For all σ that are both executions of A i and of P i , σ is an accepting run of A i if and only if σ is an accepting run of P i .
The notion of conformance of an agent with a protocol is then defined as follows: the conditions (C1) ,. . . , (C6) above are satisfied.
Let P = P 1 ∧ . . . ∧ P k be an interoperable protocol. P has at least one accepting run. Let an execution of A 1 , . . . , A k be a run of the product automaton A defined as the product automaton M in Section 2.1. Let an accepting run of A 1 , . . . , A k be an accepting run of the product automaton A. We can prove that, given k agents A 1 , . . . , A k , if each A i is conformant with P according to Definition 3, then the accepting runs of A 1 , . . . , A n are accepting runs of protocol P and A 1 , . . . , A n interoperate. In order to prove the result above, we prove the following lemmas. Lemma 1 says that any finite execution π of a set of agents A 1 , . . . , A k , with each A i conformant with P , is a prefix of a run of P . Proof. We prove that there is an accepting run of P with prefix π by induction on the length l of π. If π = , the theorem holds, as there exists an accepting run of P , by Proposition 1(b).
For the inductive case, let πm(i, j) be an execution of A 1 , . . . , A k of length l + 1. We show that there is an accepting run of P with prefix πm(i, j). By inductive hypothesis, there is an accepting run of P with prefix π. As A i can execute action m(i, j) after π| i , by the correctness of the send of A i with respect to P i , condition (C1), also P i can execute action m(i, j) just after π| i .
From the hypothesis we know that A j can receive m(i, j) as its first action after π. As P i can emit m(i, j) as its first action after π, A j and P i can synchronize to execute m(i, j) after π in P [A j ]. Hence, πm(i, j) is a finite execution of P [A j ]. Let us consider any fair choice function such that the finite execution πm (i, j) respects the choice function. By (C3) P [A j ] interoperate and, by Proposition 1, πm(i, j) can be extended to an accepting run ρ of P [A j ] respecting the choice function. By (C4), ρ is also a run of P . Hence, there is an accepting run of P with prefix πm (i, j 
, and m(i, j) can be executed by A 1 . . . A k just after π.
By Lemma 1, π is prefix of an accepting run σ of P 1 . . . P k . Therefore, for all i, P i has a run σ| i with prefix π| i . We want to exploit the fact that P 1 . . . P k are interoperable and show that choice A can be taken as the choice function for the P i 's in π. Let I be the set of all i such that choice A (A i , π| i ) = m(i, j), that is, all i such that agent A i wants to execute a send after π.
Let i ∈ I. As choice A (A i , π| i ) = m(i, j), then A i can execute m(i, j) after π| i on some of its runs. By the correctness of the send of A i with respect to P i , condition (C1), also P i can choose to execute the send action m(i, j) after π| i . Hence, we can take m(i, j) as the choice of P i after π.
Let j ∈ I, that is choice A (A j , π| j ) = receiveR. We want to show that also P j can choose to execute a receive action after π. As π is a finite execution of A 1 . . . A k and the prefix of an accepting run of P 1 . . . P k , then π is a finite execution of P [A j ]. By (C3), P [A j ] interoperate. Let us consider any fair choice function ch for P 1 
there is an accepting run ρ of P [A j ] with prefix ππ m(i, j), where m(i, j) ∈ R and π does not contain actions of agent j. By (C4) ρ is an accepting run of P . As P i executes the receive m(i, j) as its first action after π in ρ, P i can choose to execute a receive after π. Now, let choice P be a choice function for P 1 . . . P k , such that choice P (P i , π| i ) = choice A (A i , π| i ). By the interoperability of P 1 . . . P k there is an action m(i, j) which can be executed by the P i 's after π according to the choice function choice P . Action m(i, j) is the choice of agent A i after π, so that A i can send m(i, j) after π. Since P j receives message m(i, j) after π, by the conformance of A j to P , condition (C2), also agent A j can receive message m(i, j) after π. Hence, m(i, j) can be executed by A 1 . . . A k after π according to the choice function choice A . This concludes the proof of point (i).
Let us prove (ii). We have to prove that, for each fair choice, each infinite execution σ of A 1 , . . . , A k respecting choice, is an accepting run of A 1 , . . . , A k .
Let σ be an infinite execution of A 1 , . . . , A k respecting choice. It is easy to see that σ is also an execution of P . In fact, by Lemma 1 we know that each prefix π of an execution of A 1 , . . . , A k is also a prefix of a run of P . Hence, σ is also an execution of P 1 , . . . , P k . Given condition (C5), the choice function, which is fair for A 1 , . . . , A k , must also be a fair choice function for P 1 , . . . , P k . As P is interoperable and the choice function is fair for P 1 , . . . , P k , by the interoperability condition (ii), σ is an accepting run of P . Observe that, for all i, σ| i is both an execution of A i and of P i . By condition (C6), as σ| i is an accepting run of P i , σ| i must also be an accepting run of A i . It follows that σ is an accepting run of If there is a receive m(j, h + 1) in σ which is not executable by P h+1 , then there must be a prefix πm(j, h + 1) of an execution of P [A 1 , . . . , A h , A h+1 ] which is not a prefix of an accepting run of P (as it is not a prefix of an accepting run of P i ). This contradicts Lemma 1.
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Observe that, although the interoperability of A i with P (condition (C3)), guarantees that A i is able to receive the messages sent to it from the other roles in P , it does not enforce condition (C2). If (C2) were omitted in Definition 3, Theorem 1 would not be provable. In fact, in such a case, it might occur that, although agent A 1 is interoperable with other roles in P and the same holds for agent A 2 , the two agents A 1 and A 2 do not interoperate with each other and with the other roles in P . Let, for instance, P be an interoperable protocol with 4 roles, where each role has the following runs: Observe that some conditions in the definitions of interoperability and conformance can be easily verified, as for instance, the interoperability condition (i), which requires to check some conditions on all the states of the product automaton: from each state it must always be possible to execute some action according to the choices of the agents. This verification requires polynomial time in the size of the product automaton M. However, the verification of other conditions, like the interoperability condition (ii) and of conditions (C4) and (C5) is rather complex. For instance, the verification of condition (ii) requires to execute a check on all loops in the automaton M, that are non accepting loops for some role P i . Also, the verification of condition (C4), that all the runs of P [A i ] are runs of P , requires to check language inclusion between two non deterministic ω automata. This problem is, in the general case, PSPACE-hard [7] .
We may wonder whether the addition of simplifying assumption may lead to a simplified definition of the notions of conformance and interoperability. Several simplifications naturally arise: the assumption that the agents have the same receptions as the corresponding roles; the assumption that the role and agent automata are deterministic; the assumption that all protocol are finite and that finite automata can be used rather then Büchi automata to model protocols.
Concerning the first simplification, if agent A i has that same receptions as P i , conditions (C1) and (C3) can be replaced by the single condition (C1') All the runs of A i are runs of P i stating that both emissions and receptions of A i are correct with respect to P i . Verifying this condition, requires to verify the validity of the entailment A i → P i , which for DLTL (as for LTL) is a problem in PSPACE-hard. With this simplification however condition (C5) is still needed to guarantee interoperability, as shown, for instance by the example in Figure 3 .
If we restrict our consideration to protocols described by deterministic Büchi automata, rather than to non deterministic ones, the verification of some condition becomes simpler (as, for instance, the verification of (C4)), although the conditions for interoperability and conformance remain unaltered.
In the case we are considering finite state automaton, some conditions, like (C6), are not needed. Also, the interoperability conditions (i) and (ii) gets simplified. However, to guarantee interoperability of the agents which are individually conformant with the protocol, some condition playing the role of (C5) is still needed, as shown by the example in Figure 3 , which can be easily adjusted for finite state automata.
Related Work
The paper deals with the problem of agents conformance with multiparty protocols. The notion conformance we have introduced guarantees the interoperability of a set of agents which are conformant with the protocol. We have assumed that the specification of the protocol is given in a temporal action logic and we have shown that the verification of conformance can be done independently for each agents, by making use of automata-based techniques. The proposed approach deals with both terminating and non-terminating protocols.
The paper generalizes the proposal in [11] , where a notion of conformance for two-party protocols has been defined based on the policy "less emissions and more receptions". Such policy, however, is not sufficient to guarantee stuckfreeness in the multiparty case. Indeed, the notion of conformance we propose here requires in addition: 1) the correctness of the receipts an agent can do, when it is interacting with other roles of the protocol, and 2) the interoperability of the agent with the other roles of the protocol. The notion of conformance proposed here is also stronger that the notion of compliance in [13] . There, an agent A i is said to be compliant with a protocol P if, in all interactions of A i with other roles in the protocol, A i satisfies its commitments and permissions. This condition essentially corresponds to the correctness condition (C2) in Definition 3. The notion of compliance in [13] does not guarantee stuck-freeness.
Several other proposals have been put forward in the literature for dealing with agent and agent conformance and interoperability.
In [4] , several notions of compatibility and substitutability among agents have been analyzed, in which agents are modelled by Labelled Transition Systems, communication is synchronous, and models are deterministic. Substitutability is related to the notion of conformance. [4] introduces two distinct notions of substitutability (related with conformance): a first one, based on the policy "less emissions and more receptions", which does not preserves deadlock-freeness, and a second more restrictive one requiring "the same emissions and receptions". Agent executions are always terminating.
In [2] an automata based approach is used for conformance verification, by taking into account the asymmetry between messages that are sent and messages that are received. Agents and protocols are represented as deterministic finite automata, and protocols have only two roles. The approach has been extended to the multiparty case in [3] , which also accounts for the case of nondeterministic agents and roles producing the same interactions but having different branching structures. Such a case cannot be handled in the framework in [2] as well as in our framework, due to the fact that our approach is based on a trace semantics. A similar approach is also used in [1] , where an abductive framework is used to verify the conformance of agents to a choreography with any number of roles. As a difference with the above proposals, our proposal deals with protocols with infinite runs and guarantees stuck-freeness also in the multiparty case.
In [17] a notion of conformance is defined to check if an implementation model I conforms with a signature S, in the case both I and S are CCS processes, and communication is asynchronous. The policy "less emissions and the same receptions" is introduced to guarantee stuck-freeness. Our approach provides a solution to guarantees stuck-freeness without requiring an agent to have the same receptions as its role in the protocol.
The notions of conformance, coverage and interoperability are defined in [5] . A distinctive feature of that formalization is that the three notions are orthogonal to each other. Conformance and coverage are based on the semantics of runs and relies on the notion of run subsumption, concerning the single agent and its role in the protocol. Interoperability among agents is based upon the idea of blocking and depends on the computation that the agents can jointly generate. The paper only considers two-party protocols and agents with finite runs.
In [6] a notion of constitutive interoperability is proposed, which "abstracts from the process-algebraic notion of interoperability and makes commitment alignment the sole criteron" so to capture the business meaning of the business processes. As said in [6] , this notion is complementary to a notion of regulative interoperability, which takes into consideration message order, occurrence and data flow. The work we have presented here falls within the context of regulative interoperability.
In [16] Web Services are modelled as MAS and model checking is used for verifying temporal epistemic properties of OWL specifications. An OWL specification of a service is mapped to ISPL (the language of the model checker MCMAS), and a coloring of states as compliant (green) or non compliant (red) is assumed for the verification. The paper does not provide formalization of contracts (or protocols) and it does not provide techniques for automatically computing, for given a service, the states which are compliant or non compliant with a contract.
[8] focuses on the realizability problem of a framework for modeling and specifying the behaviors of reactive electronic services. In that framework, services communicate by asynchronous message passing, and are modeled by means of Büchi automata. The authors show that not every conversation protocol is realizable in the framework, and give some realizability conditions and show that each conversation protocol satisfying those conditions is realizable.
